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1. Introduction
As Baby Boomers approach retirement, the merit of retirement ﬁnancial products, in par-
ticular annuities, has been a hot topic of debate in industry and public policy. Yet, little
is understood about the asset allocation of retirees. In a world with uncertainty only over
the time of death, a retiree without a bequest motive should fully annuitize wealth (Yaari,
1965). Davidoﬀ, Brown, and Diamond (2005) generalize the result by showing that full
annuitization is optimal as long as markets are complete. In reality, retirees own more com-
plicated portfolios allocated across four major asset classes: bonds (including cash), risky
assets (including private businesses and stocks), annuities (mostly in the form of deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans and Social Security), and housing.
The primary risk that retirees face is health, which is inherently uninsurable and therefore
makes markets incomplete. On the one hand, adverse health shocks require health expendi-
tures to partially restore health. On the other hand, good health leads to longevity risk, that
is, the risk of outliving one’s ﬁnancial wealth. In addition to health risk, a bequest motive
may play a role in portfolio choice. Although there is a large literature on how labor-income
risk aﬀects the portfolio choice of working households, there has been relatively little work
on how health risk aﬀects the portfolio choice of retirees.
This paper develops a consumption and portfolio-choice model to explain the joint evolu-
tion of health status and the composition of wealth in retirement. Following the seminal work
of Grossman (1972), I model health as a durable consumption good and health expenditures
as investments in health. Health insurance is taken into account through the price of health
expenditure in relation to consumption. Essentially, I extend the Grossman model to allow
for portfolio choice between a riskless bond, a risky asset, a real annuity, and housing. Using
data on general health status and asset holdings in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
I calibrate the model to a population of retired unmarried females, aged 65 to 96. The model
explains the cross-sectional distribution of health status together with asset allocation as a
function of age and health status.
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Previous work has shown that uncertainty over health expenditures can crowd out the
demand for annuities and explain precautionary saving in liquid assets.1 However, this
ﬁnding is based on a model in which health expenditures are essentially exogenous negative
income shocks. When health expenditures are endogenized as investments in health, the
precautionary motive to save in liquid assets essentially disappears. This is because the
retiree can invest directly in health by accumulating health capital, rather than indirectly
by accumulating liquid assets. As a consequence, the bequest motive becomes a relatively
important ingredient in explaining the signiﬁcant holdings of liquid assets that is observed
in the data.
Are retirees currently under-annuitized? What would be the demand for annuities in a
world with an actuarially fair annuity market? These questions cannot be answered by a
model in which health expenditures are exogenous because an alternative market structure
can change the endogenous accumulation of health. I use the calibrated Grossman model to
assess the welfare gains of an actuarially fair annuity market. I ﬁnd that the welfare gain is
less than 1% of wealth for the median-health retiree at age 65, and the welfare gain is about
10% of wealth for the healthiest. Because the welfare gain is small except for the healthiest
retirees, the lack of demand for private annuities is less of a puzzle.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model of consump-
tion and portfolio choice in retirement. Section 3 describes the relevant measures of health
expenditures, health status, and asset holdings in the HRS. Section 4 presents the calibration
and solution of the model. Section 5 presents a welfare analysis of an actuarially fair annuity
market. Section 6 concludes.
1See Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994), Palumbo (1999), De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006), and
Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) for an analysis of precautionary saving in bonds
due to uncertain health expenditures. The analysis has been extended to include portfolio choice between
bonds, risky assets, and annuities (Edwards, 2005; Love and Perozek, 2007; Pang and Warshawsky, 2007;
Turra and Mitchell, 2004).
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2. A Model of Consumption and Portfolio Choice in
Retirement
This section describes a model of consumption and portfolio choice in retirement. The key
innovation, relative to previous models, is that health expenditure is a decision variable
for the retiree. Consequently, the model allows for the endogenous accumulation of health.
Picone, Uribe, and Wilson (1998) develop a related model in which the retiree can only save
in a riskless bond, that is, a model without portfolio choice.
2.1 Housing
Although housing is the most important tangible asset for retirees, it has been ignored in
previous analysis of portfolio choice in retirement. Cocco (2005), Hu (2005), and Yao and
Zhang (2005) develop life-cycle models that incorporate housing in portfolio choice, but they
focus on labor-income risk and abstract from health risk that is the main concern for retirees.
Let Dt denote the housing stock at the beginning of period t. The stock Dt incorporates
both the size and the quality of the house. In each period t, the house depreciates at a
constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1]. The retiree makes a net investment Et in the house, which can be
negative in the case of disinvestment. The accumulation equation for housing is
Dt = (1− δ)Dt−1 + Et, (1)
given an initial stock D0.
2.2 Health
Following Grossman (1972), the retiree’s health is modeled as a durable consumption good.
Let Ht denote the health stock at the beginning of period t. In each period t, health
depreciates at a stochastic rate ωt ≤ 1. The retiree dies if ωt = 1, that is, if her health
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depreciates entirely. The retiree’s maximum possible lifetime is T so that ωT+1 = 1 with
certainty.
After the health shock is realized in period t, the retiree makes an investment It in health
if she is still alive.2 Let 1{ωt < 1} be an indicator function that takes the value one if the
retiree survives period t, and let 1{ωt = 1} = 1− 1{ωt < 1}. The accumulation equation for
health is
Ht = (1− ωt)Ht−1 + 1{ωt < 1}It, (2)
given an initial stock H0.
2.3 Consumption and Portfolio-Choice Problem
2.3.1 Budget Constraint
The retiree enters each period t with ﬁnancial wealth Wt. The retiree uses wealth for con-
sumption Ct, housing investment Et at the relative price Pt, and health investment It at the
relative price Qt. The retiree saves the wealth remaining after consumption in N ﬁnancial
assets. For each asset i, let Ait denote the retiree’s savings at the end of period t. Let Ri,t+1
denote its gross rate of return from period t to t+ 1. The intraperiod budget constraint is
N∑
i=1
Ait = Wt − Ct − PtEt −QtIt. (3)
The intertemporal budget constraint is
Wt+1 =
N∑
i=1
AitRi,t+1, (4)
2A natural constraint to impose on health is a disinvestment constraint, It ≥ 0. However, this constraint
does not bind in practice because health depreciates at a suﬃciently high rate for individuals in retirement
age. I therefore ignore the constraint, avoiding previous health stock as an additional state variable of the
problem.
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given initial wealth W1.
2.3.2 Intraperiod Utility
In each period that the retiree is alive, her utility ﬂow is given by
U(C,D,H) = [(1− α)(C1−φDφ)1−1/ρ + αH1−1/ρ]1/(1−1/ρ), (5)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1). The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1] is the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and health. The restriction ρ ≤ 1 assures that the marginal utility
of health becomes unbounded as the health stock approaches zero, so that the retiree never
desires intentional death.
2.3.3 Utility Maximization Problem
If the retiree survives period t, she experiences a utility ﬂow U(Ct, Dt, Ht). If she dies in
period t, she leaves behind tangible wealth,
W t = Wt + (1− δ)PtDt−1, (6)
which is the sum of ﬁnancial and housing wealth. The retiree has a joy-of-giving bequest
utility over tangible wealth. Abel and Warshawsky (1988) show that a joy-of-giving bequest
motive can be interpreted as a reduced form for an altruistic bequest motive.
The retiree maximizes the objective function
E1
[
T+1∑
t=1
βt−1
t−1∏
s=2
1{ωs < 1}
(
1{ωt < 1}U(Ct, Dt, Ht)
1−γ
1− γ + 1{ωt = 1}
(uW t)
1−γ
1− γ
)]
. (7)
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, and γ > 1 is the relative risk
aversion. The parameter u > 0 controls the strength of the bequest motive, which disappears
as u→∞.
7
2.4 Transforming the Problem in Terms of Total Wealth
As stated above, ﬁnancial wealth, housing stock, and health stock are all state variables of
the consumption and portfolio-choice problem. The problem can be simpliﬁed signiﬁcantly
by collapsing the three state variables into one state variable called total wealth. The retiree’s
total wealth at the beginning of period t is
W˜t = Wt + (1− δ)PtDt−1 + (1− ωt)QtHt−1. (8)
In words, total wealth is the sum of ﬁnancial wealth, housing wealth, and health capital. In
the period in which she dies, the retiree’s total wealth is equal to tangible wealth, that is,
W˜t = W t.
Deﬁne savings in housing and health in period t as
ADt = PtDt, (9)
AHt = QtHt. (10)
Then the intraperiod budget constraint (3) can be rewritten as
N∑
i=1
Ait + ADt + AHt = W˜t − Ct. (11)
Deﬁne the gross rates of return on housing and health from period t to t + 1 as
RD,t+1 =
(1− δ)Pt+1
Pt
, (12)
RH,t+1 =
(1− ωt+1)Qt+1
Qt
. (13)
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Then the intertemporal budget constraint (4) can be rewritten as
W˜t+1 =
N∑
i=1
AitRi,t+1 + ADtRD,t+1 + AHtRH,t+1. (14)
The utility ﬂow (5) in period t can be rewritten as
Ut(Ct, ADt, AHt) = Ct
[
(1− α)
(
ADt
PtCt
)φ(1−1/ρ)
+ α
(
AHt
QtCt
)1−1/ρ]1/(1−1/ρ)
. (15)
Let At = {A1t, . . . , ANt, ADt, AHt} be the set of savings in all assets, including housing and
health. The Bellman equation is
Jt(W˜t) = max
Ct,At
Ut(Ct, ADt, AHt)
1−γ
1− γ
+βEt
[
1{ωt+1 < 1}Jt+1(W˜t+1) + 1{ωt+1 = 1}(uW˜t+1)
1−γ
1− γ
]
. (16)
2.5 Financial Assets
To complete the model, I specify the retiree’s trading universe and portfolio constraints. The
trading universe consists of three ﬁnancial assets, which capture the key economic features
of actual assets held by retirees.
2.5.1 Riskless Bond
The ﬁrst asset is a riskless bond, which has a constant gross rate of return R1t = R1. For
the period 1971 to 2006, the average real return (in excess of the CPI inﬂation rate) on the
one-year Treasury bond was 2.6%. Based on this estimate, I set R1 = 1.026.
The retiree can short the bond up to a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1) of the value of the house. A
short position on the bond can be interpreted as a mortgage or a home equity line of credit.
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Therefore, the portfolio constraint for savings in the bond is
A1t ∈ [−λPtDt,Wt − Ct − PtEt −QtIt]. (17)
I calibrate the borrowing limit to be 20% of the value of the house. This value is consistent
with the evidence that retirees are less able to tap into their home equity than younger
working households (Sinai and Souleles, 2007).
2.5.2 Risky Asset
The second asset is a risky asset, which has a stochastic gross rate of return
R2t = R2ν2t, (18)
where log ν2t ∼ N(−σ22/2, σ22) is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). For the
period 1971 to 2006, the real return (in excess of the CPI inﬂation rate) on the Center
for Research in Securities Prices value-weighted index had a mean of 7.9% and a standard
deviation of 17.2%. Based on these estimates, I set R2 = 1.056 and σ2 = 0.172. In the
life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice literature, models are commonly calibrated with
an equity premium that is lower than the historical average excess stock returns (see Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). This practice is justiﬁed through stock-market participation
costs, whether they are actual or psychological costs.
The retiree may not take a short or a leveraged position in the risky asset. Therefore,
the portfolio constraint for savings in the risky asset is
A2t ∈ [0,Wt − Ct − PtEt −QtIt]. (19)
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2.5.3 Real Annuity
The third asset is a real annuity, which has a gross rate of return that is contingent on
survival,
R3t =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ R3/pt if ωt < 10 if ωt = 1 . (20)
In this speciﬁcation, pt is an actuarially fair survival probability in period t, which is a
deterministic function of gender, birth cohort, and age. If a unit of the annuity is deﬁned
as a claim that pays oﬀ one unit of consumption in every period until death, its actuarially
fair price in period t is
P3t =
T−t∑
s=1
∏s
u=1 pt+u
R
s
3
. (21)
I use equation (20) to calibrate the return on the annuity, using R3 = 1.026 to match the
real return on the one-year Treasury bond. The survival probabilities are those for a female
born in the 1940 cohort, which are reported by the Social Security Administration (Bell and
Miller, 2005, Table 7). Similarly, I use equation (21) to calibrate the price of the annuity,
setting T to age 96.
Almost all individuals enter retirement with implicit holdings of annuities, either through
a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan or Social Security, and subsequently do not increase their
holdings of annuities. I model this situation as follows. Let B3t be the holdings of the
annuity at the end of period t, so that savings in the annuity is A3t = P3tB3t. The individual
enters retirement with an endowment B0 of the annuity. For all periods t ≥ 1, the portfolio
constraint for the annuity is B3t = B3,t−1. In Section 5, I relax this constraint and allow
the retiree to purchase additional units through an actuarially fair annuity market, which
corresponds to the constraint B3t ≥ B3,t−1.
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2.6 Relative Price of Housing
I model the gross rate of return on housing as
RDt = RDνDt, (22)
where log νDt ∼ N(−σ2D/2, σ2D) is i.i.d. The dynamics of the relative price of housing is then
determined by equation (12), normalizing the initial price level at P1 = 1.
Using equation (12) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s depreciation rate of 1.14%
on residential capital, I compute the return on the Case-Shiller Composite-10 Home Price
Index. For the period 1988 to 2006, the real housing return (in excess of the CPI inﬂation
rate) had a mean of 2.2% and a standard deviation of 7.0%. Based on these estimates, I set
RD = 1.022 and σD = 0.070.
3. Health and Retirement Study
3.1 Sample
The HRS is a panel survey designed to study the health and wealth of the elderly in the
United States. I use the RAND HRS data ﬁles, which is a version of the HRS cleaned and
processed by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging. I use the ﬁrst six waves of the HRS,
which cover the period 1992 to 2002. I focus on those born 1901 to 1940, which includes the
cohorts associated with Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (born
before 1924), the Children of Depression (born 1924 to 1930), and the initial HRS (born
1931 to 1941).
I focus my analysis on the sample of retired unmarried females, aged 65 to 96. The focus
on unmarried individuals is dictated by the fact that married individuals maximize a more
complicated objective function that depends on the health and survival of the spouse. The
focus on females is dictated by the fact that females live longer than males, and hence, have
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a longer (and arguably more interesting) retirement cycle. The focus on retirees younger
than 96 is dictated by the fact that there are very few survivors in the data set beyond that
age.
Because retirees are interviewed every two years, I code age in groups of two years from
the 65–66 to the 95–96 age group. Hence, there are a total of 16 periods in the retirement
cycle, indexed as t = 1, . . . , 16. All empirical analysis uses the person-level analysis weight
to weight observations.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Health Expenditure
Retirees in the HRS are asked to report various measures of health every two years. The
chosen measure of health for my study is the self-reported general health status, which is
categorized as poor, fair, good, very good, or excellent. Insofar as health enters the retiree’s
utility function, self-reported health status is a relevant measure of health for mapping the
model to the data. As reported in Wallace and Herzog (1995), self-reported health status is
highly correlated with objective measures of physical and mental health. Moreover, it is a
signiﬁcant predictor of future mortality as reported below.
The RAND HRS data set contains a measure of total health expenditures on hospitals,
nursing homes, doctor visits, dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, home
health care, and special facilities. It also contains a measure of out-of-pocket health ex-
penditures, that is, the part of total health expenditures paid for by the retiree. Almost
all retirees (over 99%) report health insurance coverage through Medicare, Medicaid, or
insurance from a previous employer.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the median of total health expenditures, in real 2000 dollars, by
age and health status. Total health expenditures rise in age. The median health expenditure
is $2,141 per year for retirees aged 65 to 72, and $2,399 per year for retirees aged 89 to 96.
Total health expenditures also fall in health status. For retirees aged 65 to 72, the median
health expenditure is $7,813 per year for those in poor health, and $904 per year for those
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in excellent health.
Panel B reports the median of out-of-pocket health expenditures, in real 2000 dollars, by
age and health status. Out-of-pocket health expenditures display the same pattern, namely,
rising in age and falling in health status. In terms of magnitude, however, the decline in
health status is less pronounced than that for total health expenditures. In other words,
those in poor health pay a lower share out-of-pocket than those in excellent health.
To get a sense of the composition of health expenditures, Table 2 reports the percentage
of retirees utilizing the indicated health care by age and health status. Panel A shows that
almost all retirees visit doctors and dentists, regardless of age and health status. This fact
is consistent with the view that everyone requires some minimal level of medical services for
the maintenance of health and the prevention of illnesses. Panel B shows that the use of
prescription drugs is rising in age and falling in health status. The same pattern holds for
the use of hospitals and outpatient surgery in Panel C, and the use of nursing homes, home
health care, and special facilities in Panel D. These patterns are consistent with the view
that the unhealthy require extra services for the treatment for their illnesses.
3.3 Relative Price of Health Expenditure
For each retiree, I compute the out-of-pocket health expenditure share as a ratio of out-of-
pocket health expenditures to total health expenditures. I use a censored regression model
to estimate the out-of-pocket health expenditure share as a function of cohort dummies,
health status, age, and the interaction of health status with age.
Table 3 reports the estimated regression model. On the one hand, the relation between
the out-of-pocket expenditure share and health status is mostly insigniﬁcant. On the other
hand, the out-of-pocket health expenditure share rises signiﬁcantly in health status. This
relation suggests that insurance subsidizes medical services that treat the unhealthy more
so than those that maintain the health of the already healthy.
I model health insurance through the price of health expenditure in relation to consump-
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tion. Let Q̂t(H
∗
t ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the predicted health expenditure share for the 1931–1940
cohort as a function of age and health status. The relative price of health expenditure is
Qt = Q1e
qtQ̂t(H
∗
t ), (23)
where the initial price level is normalized as Q1 = 1. For the period 1971 to 2006, the average
log growth rate of the CPI for medical care relative to that for all items less medical care
was 1.9%. Based on this estimate, I set q = 0.019.
3.4 Transition Probabilities for Health Status
In order to implement the model, I need an empirical analog to the accumulation equation
for health (2). I use data on self-reported general health status and an ordered probit model
to estimate the transition dynamics of health. In each period t, the retiree reports her health
status H∗t . The health status depends on a latent variable, Ht, through
H∗t =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 Deceased if Ht < HP
1 Poor if HP ≤ Ht < HF
2 Fair if HF ≤ Ht < HG
3 Good if HG ≤ Ht < HV G
4 Very Good if HV G ≤ Ht < HE
5 Excellent if HE ≤ Ht
. (24)
(See Wagstaﬀ (1986) and Khwaja (2002) for a similar approach.) I model logHt as a function
of cohort dummies, health status at t− 1, age, and the interaction of health status at t− 1
with age. I also control for log total health expenditure at t, where expenditures below $500
are truncated at $500.
Table 4 reports the estimated probit model. As is expected, health status at t is positively
related to health status at t − 1. In other words, retirees in poor health on average remain
15
in poor health. The coeﬃcient on age is negative, which implies that health status declines
in age. The coeﬃcient on total health expenditures is positive, which implies that health
expenditures are indeed investments that improve health status.
Using the estimated probit model, I compute the transition probabilities for health status,
Pr(H∗t |H∗t−1), in the absence of health expenditures. The predicted probabilities are those
for the 1931–1940 cohort with health expenditures below $500. Figure 1 plots the transition
probabilities by age for each category of health status. Mortality is related to health status
in a natural way. Conditional on being in poor health, death is the most likely outcome
in the subsequent period. Conditional on being in excellent health, death is the least likely
outcome in the subsequent period.
3.5 Asset Allocation in Retirement
Retirees in the HRS report holdings of four major asset classes. The ﬁrst asset class is
“bonds”, which consists of checking, savings, and money market accounts; CD, government
savings bonds, and T-bills; bonds and bond funds; and the safe part of IRA and Keogh
accounts. From the value of bonds, I subtract the value of liabilities, which consists of all
mortgages for primary and secondary residence; other home loans for primary residence; and
other debt.
The second asset class is “risky assets”, which consists of businesses; stocks, mutual
funds, and investment trusts; and the risky part of IRA and Keogh accounts. Following
Hurd (2002), I assume that half of the value of IRA and Keogh accounts is safe, and the
other half is risky.
The third asset class is “annuities”, which consists of employer pension or annuity; So-
cial Security disability and supplemental security income; and Social Security retirement.
Following Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier (1997), I use data on pension and
Social Security income to impute its asset value in each retiree’s portfolio. The asset value
of annuities is deﬁned simply as the total pension and Social Security income times the price
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of a real annuity (21). This imputation abstracts from the fact that not all pension income
is indexed to the CPI.
The fourth asset class is “housing”, which consists of primary and secondary residence.
I use a censored regression model to estimate the portfolio share in each of the four assets
as a function of cohort dummies, health status, age, and the interaction of health status with
age. Table 5 reports the estimated regression models. Older retirees have a higher share
of their portfolio in bonds, a higher share in risky assets, a lower share in annuities, and a
higher share in housing. Healthier retirees have a higher share of their portfolio in bonds, a
higher share in risky assets, a lower share in annuities, and a higher share in housing.3
For ease of comparison to the model in later analysis, Figure 2 plots the portfolio shares
in each of the four assets as a function of age and health status. The predicted portfolio
shares are those for the 1931–1940 cohort. Retirees allocate a signiﬁcant share of their wealth
to bonds and risky assets, even late in the retirement cycle. This fact has been attributed to
both a bequest motive and a precautionary saving motive in response to health uncertainty.
Housing remains a signiﬁcant share of the portfolio, even late in the retirement cycle.
Venti and Wise (1989, 2004) ﬁnd that retirees are unlikely to discontinue home ownership,
and on average, increase their home equity when they move. Based on this evidence, Venti
and Wise conclude that the large home equity in the retirement portfolio is not a consequence
of transactions costs that prevent retirees from downsizing their homes.
4. Benchmark Calibration of the Model
4.1 Calibration of Preferences
Table 6 summarizes the key parameters in the benchmark calibration. Following a standard
practice in the life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice literature, I set the subjective
3Hurd (2002) and Coile and Milligan (2006) also document asset allocation in the HRS, but they ignore
the asset value of annuities in their analysis. Rosen and Wu (2004) document evidence that the portfolio
share in risky assets is positively related to health.
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discount factor to β = 0.96. Because of the large premium on risky assets, the relative risk
aversion must be fairly large in order to match the asset allocation between bonds and risky
assets. I therefore set γ = 6. These choices are consistent with the structural estimates in
De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006).
If ρ < 1/γ, consumption and health are complements in the sense that the marginal
utility of consumption rises in the health stock. If ρ > 1/γ, consumption and health are
substitutes. Introspection suggests that consumption and health must be complements at an
extremely low level of health stock that approaches death. Viscusi and Evans (1990) analyze
a survey of chemical workers and ﬁnd that consumption and health are complements. Based
on this evidence, I set the elasticity of substitution to ρ = 0.1. As discussed below, I calibrate
the remaining preference parameters to match certain empirical moments describing health
accumulation and asset allocation.
I discretize the health stock as a grid over ﬁve values, corresponding to the ﬁve categories
of health status. I normalize the initial distribution of health at age 65–66 so that logH1 ∼
N(0, 1). By inverting the lognormal distribution function, I obtain the health stock for each
category of health status, which are reported in Table 6.
4.2 Consumption and Portfolio Policy
I solve the model through numerical dynamic programming as described in Appendix A. In
each period t, the state variables of the consumption and portfolio-choice problem are total
wealth W˜t, initial annuity holdings B0, and the relative price of housing Pt. For the purposes
of solving the problem, it is convenient to replace total wealth with the health stock Ht as
a state variable.
Figure 3 shows the consumption policy function, as a share of total wealth, at age 65–
66. Holding initial annuity holdings constant, the retiree consumes a higher share of total
wealth when she is healthier. This result is due to the fact that consumption and health are
complements in the retiree’s utility function.
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Figure 3 also shows the portfolio policy functions, as a share of total savings, at age
65–66. The policy functions for bonds and risky assets mirror that for the annuity. At high
health and low initial annuity holdings, the portfolio shares in bonds and risky assets are
high. At low health and high initial annuity holdings, the portfolio share in the annuity is
high. When the retiree cannot purchase additional units of the annuity, she holds a portfolio
of bonds and risky assets as an imperfect substitute to insure against longevity risk.
4.3 Distribution of Health Status
In order to calibrate the model, it is useful to ﬁrst document the cross-sectional distribution
of health status in the HRS. I use an ordered probit model to estimate the distribution of
health status as a function of cohort dummies and age. The left panel of Figure 4 plots the
cross-sectional distribution of health status by age for the 1931–1940 cohort.
Using the optimal consumption and portfolio policies, I simulate a population of retirees
from age 65–66 to death. In the simulation, I set the initial distribution of health status at
age 65–66 to exactly match the empirical distribution of health status. By varying the initial
annuity holdings, it is possible to generate cross-sectional variation in ﬁnancial wealth that
is independent of health. However, I abstract from this additional source of cross-sectional
heterogeneity and focus on the unconditional relation between portfolio choice and health.
Insofar as health and wealth are highly correlated in the data, the absence of variation
in wealth that is independent of health is a reasonable restriction of the simulated model.
Appendix A contains further details on the simulation.
The parameter α plays a role in determining the share of health in the retiree’s portfolio,
and consequently, the accumulation of health over the retirement cycle. A higher value of
α implies greater accumulation in health. I calibrate this parameter to match, as closely as
possible, the cross-sectional distribution of health status at age 91–92. The right panel of
Figure 4 plots the cross-sectional distribution of health status at each age for the simulated
model.
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4.4 Asset Allocation of Simulated Retirees
Figure 5 shows the asset allocation of simulated retirees as a function of age and health status.
The ﬁgure compares favorably to that of actual retirees in the HRS, shown in Figure 2. With
a limited set of parameters, it is impossible to match all the empirical moments describing
asset allocation. I therefore focus on those at the beginning of retirement, at age 65–66, and
those at the end of retirement, at age 91–92. For ease of comparison to the data, Table 7
reports the portfolio shares in each of the four tangible assets at age 65–66. Table 8 reports
the same at age 91–92.
For each health status, I calibrate the initial annuity holdings B0 to match the portfolio
share in annuity at age 65–66. Upon death, the retiree leaves behind only bonds, risky assets,
and housing. Therefore, the bequest motive plays a key role in determining the portfolio
share in annuity as the retiree approaches death. I choose the value u = 0.17 to match the
portfolio share in annuity for the median-health retiree at age 91–92.
In the model, housing is an attractive asset because the retiree can enjoy its utility ﬂow
while alive and also leave it as a bequest. The parameter φ plays a key role in determining
the portfolio share in housing. I choose the value φ = 0.1 to match the portfolio share in
housing for the median-health retiree at age 91–92.
One potentially important feature of housing that is from missing from the model is
illiquidity, that there may be transactions costs involved in selling the house.4 Transactions
costs would make liquid assets, such as bonds and risky assets, more attractive relative to
housing. Although this extension can change the relative asset allocation between bonds,
risky assets, and housing, the overall level of precautionary savings in these assets should
not be aﬀected.
4See Cocco (2005), Hu (2005), and Yao and Zhang (2005) for an analysis of housing and portfolio choice
with transactions costs.
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4.5 Importance of the Bequest Motive
In order to assess the importance of the bequest motive, I solve the model without a bequest
motive, setting the parameter u =∞. I keep the other parameters of the model the same as
those in the benchmark calibration. Figure 6 shows the asset allocation of simulated retirees
as a function of age and health status. A comparison to Figure 5 shows that the absence of
a bequest motive drastically alters the retirement portfolio. In addition to her endowment
in the annuity, a healthy retiree holds mostly risky assets and housing. An unhealthy retiree
holds mostly housing. Most retirees hold a small short position in bonds, representing a loan
against their home equity.
This analysis shows that the bequest motive is the primary reason that retirees hold bonds
and risky assets. This ﬁnding is in contrast to earlier work that emphasized a precaution-
ary motive driven by uncertain health expenditures (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994;
Palumbo, 1999; De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2006). The conclusions of the earlier work
relied on the assumption that health expenditures are exogenous and unavoidable. When
health expenditures are endogenized as investments in health, the precautionary motive to
save in liquid assets essentially disappears. This is because the retiree can invest directly in
health by accumulating health capital, rather than indirectly by accumulating liquid assets.
5. Welfare Analysis of an Actuarially Fair AnnuityMar-
ket
In the analysis so far, the retiree is constrained to hold a constant endowment of the annuity
throughout retirement. I now relax this constraint and allow the retiree to purchase addi-
tional units through an actuarially fair annuity market. In terms of the model, this amounts
to relaxing the portfolio constraint on the annuity to be B3t ≥ B3,t−1.
Figure 7 shows the asset allocation of simulated retirees as a function of age and health
status. A comparison to Figure 5 shows that the presence of an actuarially fair annuity
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market causes a relatively small change in the retirement portfolio. The biggest change
occurs for retirees in excellent health, who substitute bonds with the annuity.
How much additional wealth does a retiree require at age 65 to achieve the same level of
expected utility over retirement as in a hypothetical world with an actuarially fair annuity
market? I evaluate the welfare gains of an annuity market by comparing the solution in
the benchmark model with that in the model with an actuarially fair annuity market. The
welfare gains, as a percentage of initial wealth in the benchmark model, is 0% for retirees in
poor or fair health, 0.1% for retirees in good health, 8.6% for retirees in very good health,
and 10.4% for retirees in excellent health.
This calculation should be considered an upper bound on the welfare gains from a pri-
vate annuity market. Because of adverse selection and transactions costs, the private annuity
market oﬀers a lower rate of return than an actuarially fair annuity market based on So-
cial Security life tables and the Treasury bond rate (Warshawsky, 1988; Mitchell, Poterba,
Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999). Because the welfare gain is small except for the healthiest
retirees, the lack of demand in the private annuity market is less of a puzzle.
6. Conclusion
In a model with uncertainly only over the time of death, Friedman and Warshawsky (1990)
showed that a bequest motive is necessary to explain the lack of annuitization, especially
late in the retirement cycle. The subsequent literature argued that uncertainty over health
expenditures can explain the lack of annuitization, even in the absence of a bequest motive.
By endogenizing health accumulation, this paper has shown that previous studies, based on
a model with exogenous health expenditures, overstate the importance of the precautionary
motive to save in liquid assets. In a world with endogenous health accumulation, the retiree
can invest directly in health capital through health expenditures, rather than indirectly by
holding liquid assets. Consequently, a fairly strong bequest motive is necessary to explain the
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lack of annuitization, more consistent with the earlier ﬁndings of Friedman and Warshawsky.
I calibrate the consumption and portfolio-choice model to match the joint evolution of
health status and the composition of wealth for retired unmarried females, aged 65 to 96, in
the HRS. I then use the calibrated model to assess the welfare gains from an actuarially fair
annuity market. The welfare gain is fairly small for most retirees, and even for healthiest,
the welfare gain is only about 10% of wealth at age 65. Because the implicit holdings of
annuities through deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans and Social Security are already large, the
low demand for private annuities is a rational choice for the median-health retiree. A policy
implication of the ﬁndings is that retirees, especially those in poor health whose expected
horizon is short, should be allowed to receive some of their Social Security beneﬁts in lump
sum, rather than as an annuity (see Brown, Casey, and Mitchell, 2007, for supportive survey
evidence).
There are several issues that I have not examined, which are worth addressing in future
work. First, the model should be extended to encompass married households, in which
consumption and portfolio choice depends on the health and survival of the spouse (Lillard
and Weiss, 1997; Jacobson, 2000; Love, 2008). Second, the horizon should be extended to
include the working life before retirement. Both health status and access to health insurance
can aﬀect the timing of retirement, and consequently, consumption and portfolio decisions.5
Finally, the model can be used to assess the welfare implications of other retirement ﬁnancial
products, such as variable annuities and reverse mortgages.
5Bound (1991), Bound, Schoenbaum, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann (1999), Dwyer and Mitchell (1999),
and McGarry (2004) provide evidence on the relation between retirement and health status. Madrian (1994)
and Rogowski and Karoly (2000) provide evidence, and French and Jones (2004) and Blau and Gilleskie
(2003) develop models, on the relation between retirement and health insurance.
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Appendix A. Solution of the Consumption and Portfolio-
Choice Problem
A.1 Rescaling the Model by Total Wealth
Because the utility function is homothetic, it is convenient to rescale the consumption and
portfolio-choice model by total wealth. Deﬁne rescaled consumption as ct = Ct/W˜t. For each
asset i = 1, . . . , N,D,H , deﬁne the portfolio share of total savings as ait = Ait/(W˜t − Ct).
The intraperiod budget constraint (11) can be rewritten as
N∑
i=1
ait + aDt + aHt = 1. (25)
The intertemporal budget constraint (14) can be rewritten as
W˜t+1
W˜t
= Rt+1(1− ct), (26)
where
Rt+1 =
N∑
i=1
aitRi,t+1 + aDtRD,t+1 + aHtRH,t+1 (27)
is the gross rate of return on total wealth.
In the model with an actuarially fair annuity market, the portfolio constraints are
a1t ∈ [−λaDt, 1− aDt − aHt], (28)
a2t ∈ [0, 1− aDt − aHt], (29)
a3t ∈
[
P3tB3,t−1
W˜t(1− ct)
, 1− aDt − aHt
]
, (30)
aDt ∈
[
0,
1
1− λ
]
, (31)
aHt ∈ [0, 1]. (32)
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In the benchmark model without an annuity market, the lower bound on portfolio constraint
(30) is binding. Portfolio constraint (28) and the intraperiod budget constraint can be
combined as an inequality constraint,
a2t + a3t + (1− λ)aDt + aHt ≤ 1.
Deﬁne rescaled utility as
ut(ct, aDt, aHt) = ctVt(ct, aDt, aHt), (33)
where
Vt(ct, aDt, aHt) =
[
(1− α)
(
aDt(c
−1
t − 1)
Pt
)φ(1−1/ρ)
+ α
(
aHt(c
−1
t − 1)
Qt
)1−1/ρ]1/(1−1/ρ)
. (34)
The marginal utility of consumption is
∂ut
∂ct
= Vt − V
1/ρ
t
1− ct
[
(1− α)φ
(
aDt(c
−1
t − 1)
Pt
)φ(1−1/ρ)
+ α
(
aHt(c
−1
t − 1)
Qt
)1−1/ρ]
. (35)
The marginal utility of the portfolio share in housing is
∂ut
∂aDt
=
(1− α)φctV 1/ρt
aDt
(
aDt(c
−1
t − 1)
Pt
)φ(1−1/ρ)
. (36)
The marginal utility of the portfolio share in health is
∂ut
∂aHt
=
αctV
1/ρ
t
aHt
(
aHt(c
−1
t − 1)
Qt
)1−1/ρ
. (37)
Let at = {a2t, . . . , aNt, aDt, aHt} be the set of portfolio shares for all assets, including
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housing and health. The value function (16) can be rescaled as
jt =
Jt(W˜t)
W˜ 1−γt
= max
ct,at
ut(ct, aDt, aHt)
1−γ
1− γ
+βEt
[
R1−γt+1 (1− ct)1−γ
(
1{ωt+1 < 1}jt+1 + 1{ωt+1 = 1} u
1−γ
1− γ
)]
. (38)
The derivative of the value function with respect to consumption is
∂jt
∂ct
= u−γt
∂ut
∂ct
− β(1− γ)Et
[
R1−γt+1 (1− ct)−γ
(
1{ωt+1 < 1}jt+1 + 1{ωt+1 = 1} u
1−γ
1− γ
)]
. (39)
The derivatives of the value function with respect to the portfolio shares in ﬁnancial assets
are
∂jt
∂ait
= β(1− γ)Et[R−γt+1(Ri,t+1 − R1,t+1)(1− ct)1−γ
×
(
1{ωt+1 < 1}jt+1 + 1{ωt+1 = 1} u
1−γ
1− γ
)]
, (40)
for i = 2, . . . , N . The derivative of the value function with respect to the portfolio share in
housing is
∂jt
∂aDt
= u−γt
∂ut
∂aDt
+ β(1− γ)Et[R−γt+1(RD,t+1 − R1,t+1)(1− ct)1−γ
×
(
1{ωt+1 < 1}jt+1 + 1{ωt+1 = 1} u
1−γ
1− γ
)]
. (41)
Finally, the derivative of the value function with respect to the portfolio share in health is
∂jt
∂aHt
= u−γt
∂ut
∂aHt
+ β(1− γ)Et[R−γt+1(RH,t+1 −R1,t+1)(1− ct)1−γ
×
(
1{ωt+1 < 1}jt+1 + 1{ωt+1 = 1} u
1−γ
1− γ
)]
. (42)
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A.2 Solution in the Last Period with No Bequest Motive
A special case of the model is when the retiree has no bequest motive, which corresponds
to the parameterization u = ∞. In this case, the policy functions in the last period can be
derived in closed form. This known solution serves as a useful starting point for numerically
computing the solution when the retiree has a bequest motive.
The value function in the last period T is
jT = max
cT ,aT
uT (cT , aDT , aHT )
1−γ
1− γ . (43)
Because it is optimal to consume all ﬁnancial wealth, the optimal portfolio shares in ﬁnancial
assets are
a1T = −λaDT , (44)
a2T = 0, (45)
a3T = (ZT − 1)aHT , (46)
where ZT = 1 + P3TB3,T−1/(QTHT ).
The problem is now reduced to that of maximizing the value function, subject to the
constraint
(1− λ)aDT + ZTaHT = 1. (47)
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The ﬁrst-order conditions imply that
cT =
(1− φ)(1− ZTaHT )
1− (1− φ)ZTaHT , (48)
aDT =
1− ZTaHT
1− λ , (49)
aHT =
⎡⎣ZT + φ1−φ(1−ρ)
(1− φ)(1−φ)(1−ρ)
(
(1− α)ZT
α
)ρ(
(1− λ)φP φT
QT
)1−ρ⎤⎦−1 . (50)
A.3 Solution by Numerical Dynamic Programming
I discretize the state space as
{Hj}Jj=1 = {HP , HF , HG, HV G, HE},
{Bk}Kk=1 = {B1, . . . , BK},
{Pl}Ll=1 = {P1, . . . , PL}.
Table 6 reports the grid for the health stock. The grid for annuity holdings is equally spaced
on a logarithmic scale, based on K = 20, B1 = 0.1, and BK = 5. The grid for the relative
price of housing is equally spaced on a logarithmic scale, based on L = 5, P1 = 1, and
PL = 5. I discretize the lognormal shock to risky assets, ν2t, through ﬁve realizations with
equal probability.
Starting with the solution in period T , I solve the problem recursively for periods t =
T − 1, . . . , 1 through the following algorithm.
1. For each point on the discretized state space, ﬁnd the policy functions that maximize
the value function jt(Hj, Bk, Pl).
2. Compute the total wealth corresponding to the optimal portfolio share in health
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through the relation
W˜t(Hj , Bk, Pl) =
Qt(Hj)Hj
aHt(Hj, Bk, Pl)(1− ct(Hj, Bk, Pl)) .
A.4 Simulation of the Model
I simulate the retirement cycle for 100,000 retirees, starting at age 65–66. I set the initial
price of housing at P1 = 1 for all retirees. The initial distribution of health status is drawn
from the empirical distribution of health status at age 65–66 for the 1931–1940 cohort. For
each category of health status, H1 = {HP , HF , HG, HV G, HE}, I compute B0(H1) such that
a31(H1, B0(H1), P1)
1− aH1(H1, B0(H1), P1)
matches the portfolio share in the annuity, as a share of tangible wealth, in the HRS at age
65–66.
For periods t = 2, . . . , T , I simulate the retirement cycle for each retiree, until death,
through the following algorithm.
1. Simulate the shocks to risky asset returns, housing returns, and the health stock.
Compute the gross return on total wealth,
Rt =
3∑
i=1
ai,t−1Rit + aD,t−1RDt + aH,t−1RHt.
2. Update the total wealth through the relation
W˜t = Rt
Qt−1Ht−1
aH,t−1
.
3. If there is an actuarially fair annuity market, update the annuity holdings through the
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relation
Bt−1 =
a3,t−1Qt−1Ht−1
P3,t−1aH,t−1
.
4. Update the health stock through a closest neighbor interpolation of Ht as a function
of W˜t(Ht, Bt−1, Pt).
5. Compute the optimal consumption and portfolio policies at the state (Ht, Bt−1, Pt).
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Table 1: Health Expenditure by Age and Health Status
The table reports the median of health expenditures by age and health status. Health
expenditures are annualized, deﬂated by the CPI for medical care, and reported in real 2000
dollars. Health expenditures include the cost of hospitals, nursing homes, doctor visits,
dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, home health care, and special facilities.
The sample consists of retired unmarried females, born 1901 to 1940 and aged 65 to 96, in
the HRS.
Health Status Age
65–72 73–80 81–88 89–96
Panel A: Total Health Expenditure ($ per Year)
Poor 7,813 5,145 4,127 4,622
Fair 2,745 2,976 3,324 2,943
Good 2,191 2,273 2,419 2,273
Very Good 902 1,243 1,264 1,484
Excellent 904 851 604 1,353
All Retirees 2,141 2,273 2,500 2,399
Panel B: Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure ($ per Year)
Poor 920 768 864 853
Fair 636 709 722 805
Good 502 594 609 656
Very Good 360 449 426 450
Excellent 400 237 302 567
All Retirees 480 551 582 646
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Table 2: Health Care Utilization Rates by Age and Health Status
The table reports the percentage of retirees, by age and health status, utilizing the indicated
health care in the two years prior to the interview. The sample consists of retired unmarried
females, born 1901 to 1940 and aged 65 to 96, in the HRS.
Health Status Age
65–72 73–80 81–88 89–96
Panel A: Doctor and Dentist Visits (% of Retirees)
Poor 99 99 98 98
Fair 98 98 98 97
Good 98 98 97 96
Very Good 95 97 96 97
Excellent 97 95 89 87
All Retirees 97 98 97 96
Panel B: Prescription Drugs (% of Retirees)
Poor 97 95 93 96
Fair 93 91 93 94
Good 84 87 88 85
Very Good 72 77 79 83
Excellent 61 65 60 64
All Retirees 81 84 86 87
Panel C: Hospitals and Oupatient Surgery (% of Retirees)
Poor 63 73 66 72
Fair 52 53 59 49
Good 41 46 46 48
Very Good 25 33 40 40
Excellent 25 28 33 26
All Retirees 39 45 50 48
Panel D: Nursing Homes, Home Health Care, and Special Facilities (% of Retirees)
Poor 43 47 55 56
Fair 23 26 38 43
Good 14 19 27 30
Very Good 6 9 16 32
Excellent 7 7 11 27
All Retirees 16 20 30 37
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Table 3: Estimation of the Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure Share
The table reports estimates of a censored regression model for the out-of-pocket health
expenditure share. The latent variable depends on cohort dummies, health status, age, and
the interaction of health status with age. Health expenditures include the cost of hospitals,
nursing homes, doctor visits, dentist visits, outpatient surgery, prescription drugs, home
health care, and special facilities. The sample consists of retired unmarried females, born
1901 to 1940 and aged 65 to 96, in the HRS.
Regressor Coeﬃcient t-statistic
Cohort:
1901–1910 0.00 0.09
1911–1920 -0.02 -0.46
1921–1930 0.00 -0.07
Health Status:
Poor -0.19 -4.18
Fair -0.06 -1.81
Very Good 0.09 2.67
Excellent 0.07 1.56
(Age− 65)/10 0.01 0.48
× Poor 0.04 1.36
× Fair 0.01 0.60
× Very Good -0.04 -1.70
× Excellent -0.07 -2.09
Intercept 0.42 17.04
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Table 4: Estimation of the Transition Probabilities for Health Status
The table reports estimates of an ordered probit model for predicting health status in the
subsequent period. The latent variable depends on cohort dummies, current health status,
age, and the interaction of current health status with age. The latent variable also depends
on log total health expenditure in the subsequent period, where expenditures below $500 are
truncated at $500. The sample consists of retired unmarried females, born 1901 to 1940 and
aged 65 to 96, in the HRS.
Regressor Coeﬃcient t-statistic
Cohort:
1901–1910 -0.14 -1.00
1911–1920 0.04 0.44
1921–1930 0.09 1.43
Health Status:
Poor -1.43 -15.29
Fair -0.71 -9.07
Very Good 0.83 10.07
Excellent 1.51 10.84
(Age− 65)/10 -0.17 -2.80
× Poor 0.18 2.54
× Fair 0.03 0.48
× Very Good -0.16 -2.48
× Excellent -0.15 -1.38
Health Expenditure 0.06 5.47
Intercept:
Poor -1.35 -11.89
Fair -0.77 -7.23
Good 0.05 0.45
Very Good 1.00 9.90
Excellent 2.13 20.38
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Table 6: Model Parameters in the Benchmark Calibration
The table summarizes the model parameters in the benchmark calibration. The model
is solved at a two-year frequency to match the frequency of interviews in the HRS. The
parameter values are reported in annualized units. The grid for the health stock is based on
the normalization that the initial distribution of health at age 65–66 is logH1 ∼ N(0, 1).
Parameter Symbol Value
Preferences:
Discount factor β 0.96
Relative risk aversion γ 6
Utility weight on housing φ 0.10
Utility weight on health α 0.90
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and health ρ 0.10
Joy-of-giving bequest motive u 0.17
Asset returns:
Bond return R1 − 1 2.6%
Average risky-asset return R2 − 1 5.6%
Standard deviation of risky-asset return σ2 17.2%
Average annuity return R3 − 1 2.6%
Housing:
Borrowing limit λ 20%
Depreciation rate δ 1.14%
Average housing return RD − 1 2.2%
Standard deviation of housing return σD 7.0%
Health:
Poor health HP 0.18
Fair health HF 0.42
Good health HG 0.90
Very good health HV G 1.99
Excellent health HE 5.06
Growth rate of the relative price of medical expenditure q 1.9%
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Table 7: Asset Allocation of Simulated Retirees at Age 65–66
The table reports the portfolio share in each of the four tangible assets at age 65–66. From
left to right, the columns correspond to actual retirees in the HRS, simulated retirees in the
benchmark calibration, and simulated retirees in an economy with an actuarially fair annuity
market. The portfolio shares for the HRS, based on the estimated censored regression model
in Table 5, are those for the 1931–1940 cohort.
Health Status HRS Simulated Model
Benchmark Annuity Market
Panel A: Bonds (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 2 5 5
Fair 1 3 7
Good 3 4 4
Very Good 2 3 0
Excellent 1 10 -3
Panel B: Risky Assets (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 3 5 6
Fair 5 8 7
Good 8 12 12
Very Good 13 18 18
Excellent 14 18 14
Panel C: Annuity (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 76 76 77
Fair 74 74 75
Good 67 67 67
Very Good 58 58 62
Excellent 53 53 72
Panel D: Housing (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 18 13 12
Fair 20 15 11
Good 22 17 17
Very Good 26 20 20
Excellent 32 18 17
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Table 8: Asset Allocation of Simulated Retirees at Age 91–92
The table reports the portfolio share in each of the four tangible assets at age 91–92. From
left to right, the columns correspond to actual retirees in the HRS, simulated retirees in the
benchmark calibration, and simulated retirees in an economy with an actuarially fair annuity
market. The portfolio shares for the HRS, based on the estimated censored regression model
in Table 5, are those for the 1931–1940 cohort.
Health Status HRS Simulated Model
Benchmark Annuity Market
Panel A: Bonds (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 21 22 21
Fair 21 20 22
Good 19 20 18
Very Good 22 14 12
Excellent 20 25 3
Panel B: Risky Assets (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 7 9 9
Fair 10 11 11
Good 14 15 13
Very Good 15 14 10
Excellent 15 20 16
Panel C: Annuity (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 48 51 52
Fair 42 46 45
Good 37 37 43
Very Good 37 44 54
Excellent 36 24 50
Panel D: Housing (% of Tangible Wealth)
Poor 25 19 18
Fair 27 23 22
Good 30 28 26
Very Good 27 28 24
Excellent 29 31 31
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Figure 1: Transition Probabilities for Health Status
The ordered probit model, reported in Table 4, is used to predict the transition probabilities
for health status. The predicted probabilities are those for retired unmarried females, born
in the 1931–1940 cohort, with medical expenditures below $500.
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Figure 3: Consumption and Portfolio Policy Functions at Age 65–66
The consumption policy function is shown as a share of total wealth, ct = Ct/W˜t. The
portfolio policy functions are shown as a share of total savings, ait = Ait/(W˜t − Ct) for
all assets i = 1, 2, 3, D,H . All policy functions are shown as a function of health status,
Ht ∈ {HP , HF , HG, HV G, HE}, and log of initial annuity holdings, logB0. The relative price
of housing is held constant at P1 = 1. 46
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